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Abstract
We focus on the role of conformity with social norms and concern with
relative income in the decision to supply unpaid care for parents. Individ-
uals have di⁄erent propensities to be in￿ uenced by both relative income
and social norms, and face a time constraint on the provision of both
paid work (which increases their income) and unpaid care. We estimate
our model with a sample drawn from the British Household Panel Survey
to assess these e⁄ects empirically, estimating both the supply of unpaid
care and the e⁄ect on utility of di⁄erent preferences for relative income
and unpaid care. We ￿nd that providing care decreases individual utility:
long care hours are bad for carers (and care recipients). Women feature
disproportionately amongst care providers and their motivations for care
provision di⁄er to men￿ s, both in respect to the importance attached to
relative income and to conformity with social norms. After controlling
for other factors, men are more envious than women (attach more weight
to relative income) and indi⁄erent to social norms in relation to caring,
whereas the opposite holds for women, so status races are bad for the sup-
ply of care within families and particularly men￿ s supply. This is an issue
as caring (in right amounts) can be good for carers too if they agree with
caring norms, even when they prefer paid work to caring (as men do). We
discuss implications for care provision and working arrangements.
Key words: care, unpaid work, social norms, relative income
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1 Introduction
Care is becoming increasingly important in policy debates, both because of the
sheer costs associated with providing for the needs of children and of an age-
ing population (by 2030 it is estimated that one quarter of the pupulation will
be over 65 in both Europe and the US), and of the problems associated with
monitoring quality of service provision (Folbre, 2001). Demographic changes,
such are low fertility and higher life expectancy, and socio economic changes,
such as the increase in female participation reducing the availability of unpaid
1care provision within the household (men￿ s provision of unpaid care not match-
ing the shortfall) are usually put forward as the two explanations for the ￿ care
crisis￿ . Time use surveys show that in both developing and developed countries
women perform a larger proportion of unpaid work (all non remunerated work
activities) than men (the gender gap ranges between 1.47 hours to 4.57 hours
per day) and whilst a proportion of all unpaid work is connected to market
activities, most of the gap constitutes either direct caring or provision of in-
termediate inputs into caring for both dependants and adults (Antonoupoulos,
2008). The quesion why care is thus rethorical in the sense that considerable
amounts of caring are obviously necessary both for the reproduction of the hu-
man species and of work in the paid economy that is made visible by national
accounts (Mies, 1986; Warying, 1988; Folbre, 2001). Care regimes vary widely
across countries: Bettio and Plantenga (2004) show that across Europe the
share of women involved in unpaid care work in 1996 varied between 60 and 86
per cent. Furthermore, the norms and motivations pertaining to elder care are
likely to di⁄er to those connected to child care, as the latter is also connected
to investment in the accumulation of human capital (Beckerand Tamura, 1990;
Folbre and Nelson, 2001; Backer and Jacobsen, 2007; Casarico and Sommacal,
2008). When it comes to caring for other dependent family members (not chil-
dren), Britain is characterised by relatively high outsourcing by the family to
the private sector, as state provision is low (Bettio and Plantenga,2004). Social
care in the United Kingdom employs between four and six percent of the labour
force, it is extremely reliant upon women who want to combine part time paid
employment jobs with other family or caring responsibilities, and demand is
steadily increasing (for a recent discussion in the news see BBC, 15 Sept 2009
and related articles). The outsourced care sector is no heaven: the UK Migra-
tion Advisory Committee Recommendations (Moriarty et al, 2008) note that
longstanding recruitment and retention problems exist (which is why it is a key
target for immigration policy), as this is the third largest low-paying sector in
the UK economy with over a million jobs being paid at or around the level of
the minimum wage (Low Pay Commission, 2008) and evidence that rates of
stress and burnout are high. Data from the British Household Panel Survey
shows that between 1996 and 2007 between 14% and 19% of respondents were
caring for a sick, disabled or elderly relative. Even in the home, this work can
be quite stressful especially for those who do it for extended hours, as our data
will show. MacDonald et al (2005) reviewing a large body of empirical evidence
and reporting their own results for Canada show that intensity and combination
of hours of market and non market work are related to stress and poor health,
with women￿ s greater hours of unpaid work contribute to women experiencing
more stress than men, and the hours spent on eldercare and housework being
more stressful than those spent on childcare.
The choice between paid employment and unpaid caring is also determined
by the opportunity cost of caring: as Himmelweit illustrates the relational nature
of caring makes for limited productivity increases relative to paid work so that
the opportunity cost cost of care time increases with the increased productivity
2of paid employment (Himmelweit, 2007). From the perspective of the individual,
paid employment becomes thus more attractive as his or her own expected wage
increases, relative to the cost of outsourcing care. The evidence on caregivers
labour supply is mixed: studies of caregivers labour supply in the US ￿nd that
participation is generally similar though the hours supplied are unsurprisingly
connected with the amount of caring they do (Lilly et al, 2007 ), but controlling
for caregiving intenstity Lilly et al (2010) ￿nd that in Canada the e⁄ect is mostly
on labour market participation rather than hours supplied or wages. Casado-
Marin et al (2008) ￿nd that across Europe caregiving has an e⁄ect on entry into
the labour market of women who were out of the labour market at the onset
of caregiving; and Heitmuller (2007) and Heitmuller and Inglis (2007) ￿nd that
in the UK but those who co-reside with cared-for are signi￿cantly less likely to
participate in the labour force and earn signi￿cantly lower wages. Clearly the
decision to provide unpaid caring and hours to the paid labor market are joint
ones: using instrumental variables Graves (2010) ￿nds that in the US caring for
elderly parents has a negative e⁄ect on their daughters￿labor supply and that
the use of market care has positive and signi￿cant e⁄ects on hours worked in
the labor market.
Here we want to consider a further set of motivating factors that might ex-
plain both women￿ s and men￿ s choices in relation to their allocation of time
between unpaid caring for their parents and paid labour, and namely the roles
of conformity with social norms and concern with relative income. Social norms
and values have long featured in explanations of individual and group behaviour
by economists, from the early work on social norms and conformism by Akerlof
(1980) and Jones (1984) to the recent contributions by Akerlof and Kranton
(2002, 2005) and Corneo and Jeanne (2009, 2010). A key feature of caring is
that both social and personal norms determine both who needs caring for, who
is responsible for caring for them and how (Himmelweit, 2007) and global trends
in gender norms show that women are both expected to care and to feel ful￿lled
in doing so (Seguino, 2007). The extent to which this expectation is complied
with will obviously be partly individual, however evidence from experimental
economics suggests that gender plays a role and although women are not nec-
essarily more altruistic than men, they are more likely to be a⁄ected by social
clues on appropriate behaviour (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Another motivating
factor is the desire to work and earn, and the literature on status suggest that
relative rather than absolute income is an important motivating factor in ef-
fort and time allocation decisions (Frank, 1985; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Besley
and Ghatak, 2008), so rather than focusing on the e⁄ect of wage in our model
and empirical estimation we consider relative income as a motivating device:
a loss of utility results from ones￿income being lower than that of a reference
group and from not conforming with the prevailing norms on care provision.
We assume that individuals have di⁄erent propensities to be in￿ uenced by both
relative income and social norms, and face a time constraint on the provision
of both paid work (which increases their income) and unpaid care. We use a
sample drawn from the British Household Panel Survey to assess these e⁄ects
empirically, estimating both the supply of unpaid care and the e⁄ect on utility
3of di⁄erent preferences for relative income and unpaid care. We also examine
gender di⁄erences in both unpaid care provision and in the degrees of envy
and conformity with social norms, controlling for various individual factors that
likely a⁄ect economic opportunities and for household income.
2 The model
An economy is populated by individuals indexed by i. Individual i is character-
ized by preferences with respect to i￿ s relative income and his or her attitude
to volunteering care (this can be care for elderly within i￿ s family). We denote
income with yi, and the fraction of time devoted to unpaid care with ci. Pref-
erences are described by a utility function, Ui (yi;ci) which we assume to be
separable in the two variables,
Ui (yi;ci) = ￿iui (yi) + (1 ￿ ￿i)vi (ci);
where ￿i is the relative weight the individual attaches to his or her satisfaction
with relative income. It would not be di¢ cult to consider a more general case
in which preferences with respect to status and care are interpedendent.
An individual￿ s satisfaction with his or her relative income depends on how
his or her income compares to a certain level of income y￿, which represents the
income of a relevant reference group. In our empirical estimates we develop two
measures of reference income: labour income when we model the supply of care
and household income when we model utility (because not everyone works). In
particular, we assume
ui (yi) =





yi ￿  iy￿
y￿
￿2
;  i ￿ 0; ￿i ￿ 0.
It is not unreasonable to consider only those con￿gurations of parameters for
which the utility is increasing in income, according to traditional approaches, ￿
unless condition
￿i
yi ￿  iy￿
y￿ < 1 (1)
holds, the chosen functional form makes it possible for satisfaction to fall with
income at the higher end, which, however, may not be entirely implausible. We
will discuss the consequences of this possibility later on. Note that for incomes
below yi ￿ y￿ ( i + 1=￿i) satisfaction increases with income.
Parameter  i measures the degree of aspiration:  i = 0 means that for i the
external standards of lifestyle do not matter,  i less (greater) than one implies
that i aspired to achieve lower (higher) standards. Parameter ￿i re￿ ects the
degree of envy: observe that as the economy-wide living standard increases, ui
falls, as long as i derives more satisfaction from higher income (condition (1)







yi ￿  iy￿
y￿
￿





yi ￿  iy￿
y￿ < 0 for yi <  iy￿:
An individual￿ s attitude to the voluntary provision of care consists of two
components. Firstly, there is a disutility from providing care (putting in phys-
ical e⁄ort, having to perform unpleasant procedures, etc.). We assume this
disutility is linear in ci. Secondly, there is an economy-wide social norm regard-
ing volunteered care, say, regular visits and help to one￿ s elderly parents, etc.,
measured by c￿. The degree of conformity with the norm is however individual
(or, alternatively, an individual perception of what the norm should be may be
di⁄erent). We assume that the disutility of not conforming to this norm depends
on the distance between ci and the individually perceived norm, ￿ic￿. Thus, we
de￿ne









; "i > 0; ￿i > 0; ￿i > 0:
The larger "i, the more disutility i incurs from providing an additional hour
of care. The larger ￿i, the stronger is the social norm regarding volunteered
care in i￿ s perception, and the larger ￿i, the more i is willing to conform with
this perceived norm. To summarize, individual i is characterized by a vector of
parameters, ￿i = (wi;￿i;￿i; i;"i;￿i;￿i), whereas the economy is described by
￿ = (y￿;c￿).
An individual divides his or her time (normalized to unity) between paid
work and unpaid care to maximize his or her satisfaction with achieved income,
by means of labour income, and with compliance with social norms, by providing
unpaid care. In the optimum no time is wasted, so i solves
max
ci2[0;1]
Ui = ￿iui (wi (1 ￿ ci)) + (1 ￿ ￿i)vi (ci):
Note that we allow for zero labour income: here we abstract from individual
consumption as well as other standard components of a general equilibrium
model, in order to focus on the issue of care provision. However this framework
can be easily incorporated into a more general framework, where, for example,
consumption is shared within a household, so some members of household may
have zero labour income and positive consumption.
The optimal choice of care is described by the following:
co
i (￿i;￿) = maxfminf0;c(￿i;￿)g;1g;
where
c(￿i;￿) =
￿i (wi=y￿ ￿  i) + [(1 ￿ ￿i)=￿i]y￿ (￿i￿i ￿ "i)=(wic￿) ￿ 1
￿iwi=y￿ + [(1 ￿ ￿i)=￿i]￿iy￿=(wic￿2)
:
5Clearly, c is increasing in both ￿i and ￿i, and decreasing in both "i and  i. In
other words, the individuals that tend to provide more unpaid care are those
who perceived the social norm as stronger, are more willing to comply with it,
experience less disutility from providing an extra hour of care, and have humbler









(1=￿i + ￿i i)￿iy￿=
￿
wic￿2￿
+ [￿i￿i ￿ "i (1 ￿ c￿)]￿i=c￿
[￿iwi=y￿ + [(1 ￿ ￿i)=￿i]￿iy￿=(wic￿2)]
2 :
This is negative, unless "i is su¢ ciently large, so that the second term in the
numerator is negative. This, however, would lead to c being negative, so that
optimal choice of care is zero and comparative statics do not apply. (Indeed,
when the disutility cost of providing care is very high, no care will be provided.)
Thus, a larger weight on social status leads to lower care provision.
Below we provide some illustrations of the relationship between the utility-
maximizing level of care provision and the degree of envy, captured by parameter
￿i. We present some interesting cases in the ￿gures below. In both ￿gures we
used y￿ = 50, c￿ = 1=4, ￿i =  i = 1, "i = 1=10, ￿i = 1=2; the marginal utility
of income is positive along the curves.
Figure 1: Care and wage
Care and wage: ￿ = 1=4 (red) and 3=4 (blue),
￿ = 1=4 (solid) and 1 (dash).
Figure 2: Care and envy
6Care and envy: ￿ = 1=4 (red) and 3=4 (blue),
w = 20 (solid) and 100 (dash).
The left panel shows how care provision changes with wage for two values
of ￿i; the solid lines correspond to ￿i = 1=4 and the dash lines correspond to
￿i = 3=4. As wage starts increasing from zero, care provision falls monotonically
for ￿i = 1=4, and it becomes zero when the weight of relative income is relatively
high. For ￿i = 3=4 care provision changes non-monotonically with wage: it falls
for low wages and rises for high wages. The right panel illustrates the same
phenomenon, now looking at care as function of ￿i for two values of w: solid
lines correspond to wi = 20, and dash lines correspond to wi = 100. When the
wage is low, care provision falls as ￿i increases, whereas the converse is true
when the wage is high.
In the simulations illustrated in this set of ￿gures the level of care norm
was ￿xed exogenously. According to Akerlof￿ s theory of social custom (Akerlof,
1980), the fact that people may tend to generally believe or disregard any social
code, and the existence of a range of social codes, together may imply that
multiple equilibria exist, each corresponding to a di⁄erent social code. So social
norms are endogenously determined and a⁄ect individual utility. In our context
caring norms di⁄er in di⁄erent societies, and changing social attitudes towards it
can therefore be expected to produce di⁄erent market equilibria. The reputation
function in Akerlof depends on the individual￿ s obedience of the code and the
proportion of the population who believe in that code, and accordingly we now
assume that in equilibrium the care norm equals the average provision of care
across the agents in the economy. The following set of ￿gures shows how the
equilibrium care norm and the resulting utility level depend on the reference
income.
7Figure 3: Care norm and reference income
Care norm and reference income: wL = 20,
wH = 100, ￿L = 1=2, ￿H = 3=2, ￿ =   = ’ = 1,
" = 1=10.
Figure 4: Well being and reference income
8Well-being and reference income: wL = 20 (red),
wH = 100 (blue), ￿L = 1=2 (dash), ￿H = 3=2
(solid), ￿ =   = ’ = 1, " = 1=10.
These simulations illustrate the outcome in an economy with four di⁄erent
types of agents: with lower and higher wage rate, and with lower and higher
compliance with social norms, assuming negative correlation between the wage
rate and the compliance (speci￿cally, there are equal proportions of the agents
with the lower and higher wage rates, the fraction of highly compliant agents in
the ￿rst group is 3=4, whereas in the second group it is 1=4). This re￿ ect the
empirical observation that women, on average, have lower wage rates and are
more sensitive to social norms, compared to men. The left panel shows that the
equilibrium care norm in this society falls as the reference income increases. The
right panel shows that the utility level for the low-wage group (red curves) falls
as the reference income increases, while for the high-wage group (blue curves)
the utility level changes non-monotonically.
Finally, we assume that the reference income is also determined endoge-
nously, as the average income across all agents in the economy. To illustrate
the predictions of the model we now assume that there are equal proportions
of agents with lower and higher sensitivity to the care norm. All agents in the
￿rst group have the same wage rate, w, and in the second group the wage rate
of the rest is ￿￿w. In the ￿gures below we show how the unpaid care provision
and the labour income change as ￿ increases. In the left panel the red curve
shows the equilibrium care norm, and the blue (green) curve shows the equi-
librium care provision by agents with higher (lower) sensitivity to care norm.
As the wage rate of the compliant group increases, the care provision in both
9groups falls, and so does the care norm: the income e⁄ect dominates. Once the
wage rate for the compliant group exceeds that of the less compliant group, for
the former the substitution e⁄ect starts dominating, and care provision by the
more compliant group starts rising. This drives up the care norm, and the less
compliate group also starts providing more care. However, the more compliant
group always provides more care than the less compliant group. The pattern in
labour income for the two groups and the reference income are illustrated on the
right panel. The simulations suggest that an increase in the opportunity cost
of the unpaid care in a society will always result in a fall in care provision and
deterioration of the care norm, unless the agents￿sensitivity to the social norms
in care provision increases. In other words, the emphasis should be on instill-
ing higher compliance with social norms in unpaid care provision, e.g. though
education system, mass media, etc.
Figure 5: Care norm and care provision
Care norm (red) and care provision: ￿ = 3=2
(blue) and 1=2 (green).
Figure 6: Reference income and labour
10Reference income (red) and labour earnings for
￿ = 3=2 (blue) and 1=2 (green).
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
We now take our model to data in order to see whether the parameters of
interest to our analysis are signi￿cant and whether they di⁄er systematically by
gender, once controlling for other individual factors. We utilise data from the
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS, see for information UK Data Archive),
a longitudinal study of around 5,500 households and over 10,000 individuals
which began in 1991 and collects annual data on social and economic variables
at the individual and household level. We use all respondents of working age
(adults over 16 years of age and under 65) who responded to the survey at least
twice between the years 1996 (wave 6, when life satisfaction questions were ￿rst
asked) to 2007 (wave 17) which leads to a sample size of 19,320 individuals
(10,292 women and 9,028 men) with 2-12 years worth of data (132,198 person
years).
Individuals are asked whether they care for people within and outside of
the household, and their relation to the person. We utilise only those who
care for a parent to re￿ ect the social norm question is in relation to caring
for parents. Between 1996 and 2007 between 7% and 10% of respondents were
caring for a sick, disabled or elderly parent. 10% of women compared to 7% of
11men undertake some caring for parents, and women are more likely to be doing
longer hours of caring (see Table 3).
In order to proxy the social norm in relation to care, we use answers to the
question "Adult children should care for parents" which is asked in every other
wave (1996, 1998. 2000, 2002 and 2004, 2006 in our dataset) on the scale of
strongly agree, agree, neither agree/disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree.
The responses to this question are reasonably stable over time so we ￿ll in the
years where this question was not asked with the previous wave￿ s response.
Around 38% (strongly) agree with this statement, 30% are neutral and 31%
(strongly) disagree. As seen in Table 1 males are more likely to agree or agree
strongly than women with the question, with females more likely to disagree
or disagree strongly compared to men. As would be expected there is a higher
agreement among those who care for their parents.
Table 1: Care norm: responses to statement that ￿Adult children should
care for parents￿by gender
We model both the supply of care and life satisfaction. We model care supply
(Hc) in conjunction with employment hours(He) since these are likely to be a
joint decision, and use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) (Zellner, 1962)
which allows the error terms from both the care and hours worked regressions
to be correlated, as tests show to be the case for our model. We concentrate
on respondents who care for parents and the years in which they cared for
them, and select a sample of individuals who have worked at some point (either
whilst, before or after caring) to avoid the possibly that those who would not
otherwise be employment may have more time available to care. Hours worked
include all hours devoted to the labour market including usual hours and hours
from self employment, secondary employment and overtime. In the BHPS care
is measured in intervals (0-4, 5-9, 10-19, 20-34, 35-49, 50-99, 100+ hours per
week) so we use the midpoint of each category to create a continuous variable.
Our regressions models are as follows with X a vector of control variables, INC
a vector of variables in relation to income and CAR a vector of variables in













SUR regression assumes the errors in the individual equation are homoskedas-
tic and independent of time but the allows ther errors from the two equations
to be correlated. In order to ascertain the utility/disutility from care, we inves-
tigate the e⁄ect of care on life satisfaction. Our dependent variable is overall
life satisfaction (which provides a proxy for utility), with respondents in the
BHPS asked "How satis￿ed or dissatis￿ed are you with your life overall?", with
answers provided along a seven point scale with 1 being not satis￿ed at all
12and 7 being completely satis￿ed. Due to comprehensive health questions asked
in that wave the BHPS omitted this question in 2001 so we exclude this year
from our life satisfaction analysis, we includes both carers (for parents) and
non-carers. Although the responses to the life satisfaction question are ordered
we treat the variable as continuous in order to exploit the panel nature of the
data. Past research has shown that results di⁄er little by whether the vari-
able is treated as continuous or an ordered variable but controlling for ￿xed
e⁄ects is important ( Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; Clark et al., 2008;
Mentesoglu and Vendrik, 2009). Fixed e⁄ects allow us to control unobserved
attributes such as personality which is increasingly being accepted as playing a
big part in an individual￿ s well-being. However we do have some information
on individual personality traits, so we run both ￿xed and random e⁄ects model
of life satisfaction, as follows for individual i in period t :
LSit = Xit￿ + INCit￿ + CARit￿ + ￿i + uit
X is a vector of control variables, INC a vector of income related variables
and CAR a vector of caring variables - with details of the variables explained
below. ￿i is an unobserved individual e⁄ect and uitis the error term. .
In both the SUR and the life satisfaction models we include a number of
controls (see appendix 1 for variable de￿nitions): age group, whether living
with a partner or spouse, the number of children of certain age ranges, religion,
quali￿cations, region and wave dummies. For the hours cared (but not the hours
worked) equation we include their responses to the caring for parents social norm
question as well as a control for whether the parent lives in the household (since
we expect those who care within the household will do more hours) and a control
for if they care for others besides their parents (since the hours cared questions
relates to all caring). We are also able to include controls for personality traits
since the BHPS collected data on personality using a shortened version of the
￿ve factor model (see Taylor et al, 2010 for details), which consist of ￿ve factors
of personality: agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism and
openness to experience. Personality questions were asked in the 2005 wave, but
we make the assumption as others have done that they are ￿xed (e.g. Wichert
and Pohlmeier, 2010). 85% of women and 82% of men in our sample answered
these questions in 2005. The questions were asked on a Likert scale of 1 "does
not apply" to 7"applies to me, with these questions not ordered by personality
factor. See appendix 2 for the an overview of the questions asked with a total
score for each factor obtained by summing the responses to the three questions
for that trait (with negative questions reverse coded).
In the SUR models we also include attitudes to family life. Individuals are
asked a set of questions on attitudes to family life, which are asked in alternate
waves (so we use the previous wave￿ s responses for waves without this question).
People are asked to state their opinion on a scale of 1 (strongly agree) to 5
(strongly disagree) with the following questions:
A -Pre-school child su⁄ers if mother works
B - Family su⁄ers if mother works full-time
13C - Women and family happier if she works
D - Husband and wife should both contribute to the household income
E ￿Full time job makes women independent
F ￿Husband should earn wife stay at home
In order to obtain an overall attitude we simply take an average across the six
questions (we reverse coded questions A, B and F), and therefore a higher score
would re￿ ect views more in line with traditional gender roles. Past studies (e.g.
Berrington et al., 2008, Schober, 2009) have taken a similar approach, using
factor analysis to demonstrate that the responses to these questions represent
an underlying attitude.
In the life satisfaction models we include hours spent caring in categories
of: none, 0-9 hours, 10-34 and over 35, as well as including the social norm
for those who care, an indicator of whether they are employed in the labour
market, housework hours, marital status, with personality traits and other time
invariant controls in the random e⁄ects model.
Reference income is de￿ned di⁄erently in the supply of care/work hours and
the life satisfaction models. We use all members of the BHPS in a wave to
create reference groups for each wave, since the BHPS is representative of the
UK population. In the supply of care models we use reference labour income,
since we are interested in only those who are or were employed at some point.
Each individual￿ s reference group is de￿ned by their occupation and gender and
the average labour income is taken across all members of that group in that wave.
Therefore this reference labour income can be interpreted as a opportunity cost
of not working. We also include additional household income in the supply
models, a measure of the other resources in the household, calculated as total
household income excluding the individual￿ s labour income, adjusting for the
number of adults and children (weighted by 0.5). In the life satisfaction models
we use household reference income across age, gender and quali￿cation (since
we are interested in all not just those in employment) and this is de￿ned at the
individual level so this compares household income across people with similar
characteristics (since di⁄erent individuals in the household may have di⁄erent
reference groups). Again we use all members of the BHPS in that wave to
calculate household reference income. We utilise the rank of household income
within the reference group rather than the reference income since this has been
shown to be more important (Boyce et al., 2010).
3.1 Empirical Results
Supply of Care We start by examining our SUR models of hours supplied
to care and the labour market, as outlined in our data section. Firstly we
note the Breusch Pagan tests demonstrate that the errors from our care and
labour supply models are correlated, which implies the SUR model approach
will provide more e¢ cient results.
14Table 2: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions of Care and Employment Hours
Our results indicate that opportunity costs, social norms, positionality and
personality all play a role in determining the supply of unpaid care. Income
clearly plays a role as witnessed by the fact that those without quali￿cations
supply more care and less work, as are those living with a partner (once con-
trolling for children). However people clearly choose to do fewer hours of work
and more hours of care if additional household income increases. Total house-
hold income (adjusted for number of adults and children in the household) is
higher for those who care for parents - £12,445 compared with £11,795 for those
who do not ￿as is additional household income (£7873 compared with £7545).
Descriptive statistics indicate that those who care on average have higher ad-
ditional household income, lower reference labour income and higher reference
household income, suggesting on the one hand that the opportunity cost of car-
ing is not very high and that they choose to do so as the household could a⁄ord
to outsource the care.
Social norms clearly matter and their impact di⁄ers by gender: Catholic and
other religions are likely to devote more care hours than Christians and non-
religious individuals, but the e⁄ect is weaker when split by gender. Reference
income matters and reduces care hours, but much more so for men than women.
This ￿nding could re￿ ect that on average men hold more traditional values and
may feel they should be the main breadwinner (men have an average score of
2.90 compared to 2.77 for women on the attitudes to family life questions). We
explore this e⁄ect in more detail when looking at life satisfaction. Attitudes to
family life in￿ uence both care and work hours for females, with females who
hold more traditional values of family life supplying more care hours and fewer
work hours, but has no in￿ uence on men.
Personality has an impact on the supply of unpaid care too: those more open
to experience (e.g. more willing to try new things and possible more risk loving)
are likely to both work and care fewer hours. Being more extravert also reduces
the supply of unpaid caring. More conscientious people, more agreeable women,
and more extravert men work longer hours. Women who are more neurotic are
instead likely to work fewer hours. The presence of children makes women less
likely to work (but not men), and women with children aged three and above
are more likely to supply more care hours. As is commonly reported women
on average do less work hours than men: women work on average 33 hours (32
hours if they care for parents) and men on average 45 hours (regardless of if
they care for parents or not).
Women are generally more likely to care for their parents and also do more
care hours (table 3), which provides a possible explanation for the fact that the
e⁄ect of agreeing with the caring norm is also di⁄erent by gender: men agreeing
with the caring norm provide more hours, but women who strongly disagree
with the norm also provide more hours. In the 2006 wave a set of questions
were asked for those who have parents alive outside of the household about the
15tasks undertaken on behalf of their parents. . Table 4 compares the tasks done
by males and females for those individuals who stated they cared for a parent
outside of the household in 2006 and responded to these questions. Men and
women also perform di⁄erent caring tasks, as shown in table 4 below Women
tend to do more unpleasant tasks such as helping with personal needs. We
investigate the implications of these ￿ndings modelling the e⁄ect of care on life
satisfaction.
Table 3: Distribution of Caring and Hours Cared For by Gender
Table 4: Tasks performed for parents by those who care for parents outside
of household
Life Satisfaction We now turn to examining the e⁄ect of caring on life sat-
isfaction, using both ￿xed e⁄ect and random e⁄ect models. It is clear from the
random e⁄ect models the impact of personality traits on life satisfaction with
more agreeable, conscientious and extravert individuals reporting higher levels
of satisfaction, whilst more neurotic and open to experience individuals report
lower levels.
Table 5: Life Satisfaction Models
As found in the literature, relative income matters more than actual income
for life satisfaction and we ￿nd that those who are ranked higher within their
reference group are happier. We also ￿nd that men are more envious than
women as rank of income seems more important to men than women for life
satisfaction. The e⁄ect of caring hours di⁄ers by gender: hours spent caring
reduce life satisfaction for women and this e⁄ect is increasing as hours increases,
however there is no signi￿cant for men, which may be due to the di⁄erent tasks
they perform: as shown in table 4 earlier women are much more likely to cook
meals, wash, iron or clean and to help with personal needs, whilst men are more
likely to help decorate, help with the garden or repairs.
Caring norms also matter and in ways that di⁄er by gender: those who
strongly agree or agree are more likely to do longer hours, with longer hours
reducing life satisfaction. Looking at the interaction between the norm and
caring, we ￿nd that the e⁄ect of lower satisfaction from caring is reduced if
the person strongly agrees or agrees with caring for parents, however there is
no signi￿cant e⁄ect for men. Again these gender di⁄erences could re￿ ect the
di⁄erent tasks performed by gender. Males are more likely to agree strongly or
agree that children should look after parents, women more likely to disagree (or
disagree strongly). As would be expected among those who care for parents a
higher proportion agree or strongly agree with the statement. It is possible of
course that men may be more willing to state that adult children should look
after parents as they do "nicer" tasks and expect the women to do the caring.
164 Discussion
Policy informing care provision needs to be based on both the projected caring
needs of the poulation and on an understanding of the factors motivating unpaid
care provision within households. Our model provides a simple representation
of two important motivating factors in the decision to provide unpaid care: the
importance of relative income and of conforming with social norms in relation to
care. Our ￿ndings suggest that the supply of unpaid care for parents is heavily
in￿ uenced not just by direct and opportunity costs, but also by social norms in a
number of di⁄erent ways which vary by gender. Our theoretical model suggests
that reducing gender earning gaps can increase the proportion of men willing to
supply unpaid care, subject to their relative conformity with caring norms and
status. Our empirical analysis supports that by showing that as men are more
envious than women the e⁄ect will also depend on their individual propensity
to be a⁄ected by status races. As for women, they are clearly a⁄ected by caring
norms as well as gender norms when deciding to supply unpaid care for their
parents and therefore the e⁄ect of the opportunity cost from not being in the
labour market will always be partly hampered by norms.
Of course it can be argued that reducing gender earning gaps requires in
an of itself changing social norms pertaining to the gender division of labour
so the e⁄ect of norms is indeed quite fundamental to the provision of unpaid
care within families, in addition to the costs of outsourcing care and the quality
of the provision available. Our empirical estimates using data from the BHPS
con￿rm that providing care decreases individual utility as we ￿nd as expected
that satisfaction decreases as the number of hours spent caring increases: long
care hours are bad for carers (and care recipients. Again as expected we ￿nd
that women feature disproportionately amongs care providers; however we also
￿nd that their motivations for care provision di⁄er to men￿ s, both in respect to
the importance attached to relative income and to conformity with social norms.
After controlling for other factors, men are more envious than women (attach
more weight to relative income) and indi⁄erent to social norms in relation to
caring, whereas the opposite holds for women) so status races are bad for the
supply of care within families and particularly men￿ s supply. This is an issue as
caring (in right amounts) can be good for carers too if they agree with caring
norms, even when they prefer paid work to caring (as men do). The implications
for both care provision outside families and for current working arrangements
(both working hours and ￿ exible working) are in line with those put forward in
relation to childcare, but given that a productivity link (via the e⁄ect of care
on human capital accumulation) cannot be established for eldercare, it is easy
to see why the scenarios for the evolution of care policy in the UK envisaged
by Himmelweit may look so bleak (Himmelweit, 2007): the marginalization of
unpaid carers in both income and utility terms is indeed likely to continue unless
radical policies of direct support to unpaid carers are envisaged alongside more
widely avaliable and a⁄ordable external care provision.
17References
[1] Akerlof, G. (1980) ￿ A Theory of Social Custom - of which Unemployment
may be One Consequence,￿ Quarterly Journal of Economics 94 (4): 749-775.
[2] Akerlof, G.A. and R.E. Kranton (2002) ￿ Identity and Schooling: Some
Lessons for the Economics of Education￿ Journal of Economic Literature
40: 1167-1201.
[3] Akerlof, G.A. and R.E. Kranton (2005) ￿ Social divisions within schools: how
school policies can a⁄ect students￿ identities and educational choices,￿ in:
Barrett C.B. (Ed.), The social economics of poverty, pp. 188￿ 213. Rout-
ledge: New York.
[4] Antonopoulos,R. (2008) ￿ The Unpaid Care Work￿ Paid Work Connection￿
Working Paper No. 541 The Levy Economics Institute Bard College.
[5] Baker, Matthew J.& Joyce P. Jacobsen (2007) ￿ Marriage, Specialization,
and the Gender Division of Labor.￿Journal of Labor Economics, University
of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 763-793.
[6] Becker, Gary S & Murphy, Kevin M & Tamura, Robert (1990) ￿ Human
Capital, Fertility, and Economic Growth,￿Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, 98(5):S12-37,
[7] Besley, Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak, (2008) ￿ Status incen-
tives,￿ American Economic Review 98 (2): 206-211.
[8] Berrington, A., Yongljian, H., Smith, P. & Sturgis, P. (2008) A graphi-
cal chain model for reciprocal relationships between women￿ s gender role
attutides and labour force participation. Journal of the Royal Statistical
Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 171, 89-108.
[9] BBC 15 Sept 2009 ￿ Looming care crisis￿
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/3109222.stm
[10] Bettio and Plantenga (2004) ￿ Comparing Care Regimes in Europe￿ , Femi-
nist Economics, 10 (1): 85 - 113.
[11] Boyce, C. J., Brown, G. D. A., & Moore, S. C. (2010). Money and hap-
piness: Rank of income, not income, a⁄ects life satisfaction, Psychological
Science.
18[12] Casado-Marin D., P. Garcia-Gomez and A. Lopez-Nicolas (2008) Labour
and income e⁄ects of informal caregiving across Europe: an evaluation
using matching techniques￿HEDG WP 08/23, University of York.
[13] Casarico, A and A. Sommacal (2008) Labor Income Taxation, Human Cap-
ital and Growth: The Role of Child CareCEsifo wp 2363
[14] Clark, Andrew, Ed Diner, Yannis Georgellis and Richard E. Lucas. 2008.
"Lags and Leads in Life Satisfaction: A Test of The Baseline Hypothesis."
Economic Journal, 118 (526): F222-243
[15] Clark, Andrew E., Paul Frijters, and Michael A. Shields (2008) ￿ Relative
Income, Happiness, and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox
and Other Puzzles.￿Journal of Economic Literature 46 (1): 95-144.
[16] Clark, A.E. and C. Senik (2009) ￿ Who compares to whom? The anatomy
of income comparisons in Europe ￿
[17] Corneo, G. and O. Jeanne (2010) ￿ Symbolic values, occupational choice,
and economic development.￿European Economic Review, 54(2): 237-251.
[18] Corneo, G. and O. Jeanne (2009b) ￿ A theory of tolerance,￿ Journal of Public
Economics 93(5-6): 691-702.
[19] Croson, R. and U. Gneezy (2009) ￿ Gender Di⁄erences in Preferences￿Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 47(2): 448-474.
[20] Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. (2005) ￿ Income and well-being: an empirical analysis
of the comparison income e⁄ect￿Journal of Public Economics 89 () 997￿
1019.
[21] Ferrer-I-Carbonell, Ada and Paul Frijters. 2004. How Important is Method-
ology for the Estimates of the Determinants of Happiness? The Economic
Journal, 114, 641-659.
[22] Folbre, N. (2001) The Invisible Heart: Economics and Family Values New
York: The Free Press.
[23] Folbre, N. and J. A. Nelson (2000) ￿ For Love or Money￿ Or Both?￿Journal
of Economic Perspectives 14(4):123￿ 140.
[24] Folbre, N (1994) Children as Public Goods The American Economic Re-
view, Vol. 84, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Sixth
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1994), pp.
86 -90
[25] Frank, R.H. (1985). Choosing the Right Pond Human Behavior and the
Quest for Status. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19[26] Graves, J. (2010) ￿ Care Provision to Elderly Parents and Women￿ s Hours
Worked in the Labour Market￿Paper presented at the ASSA Meeting 2011.
[27] Heitmuler, A. (2007) ￿ The Chicken or the Egg? Endogeneity in Labour
Market Participation of Informal Carers in England￿ Journal of Health
Economics, 26(3):536-559.
[28] Heitmuler,A. and K. Inglis (2007) ￿ The Earnings of Informal Care-
givers:Wage Di⁄erentials and Opportunity Costs￿ Journal of Health Eco-
nomics, 26(3):821-841.
[29] Himmelweit, S. (2007) ￿ The prospects for caring: economic theory and
policy analysis.￿Cambridge Journal of Economics, 31(4), pp. 581￿ 599.
[30] Jones, Steven R.G. (1984) The Economics of Conformism. Basil Blackwell:
Oxford, New York
[31] Kan, Man-Yeeand J. Gershuny (2006) ￿ Human Capital and Social Position
in Britain: creating a measure of wage earning potential from BHPS data,
1991-2004.￿ISER Working Paper, Colchester: University of Essex.
[32] Lilly, M.B., A. Laporte and P.C.Coyte (2010) ￿ Do they care too much to
work? The in￿ uence of caregiving intensity on the labour force participatio
of unpaid caregivers in Canada￿Journal of Health Economics, 29: 895-903.
[33] Lilly, M.B., A. Laporte and P.C.Coyte (2007) ￿ Labor Market Work and
HOme Care￿ s Unpaid Caregivers: A Systematic Review of Labor Force
Participation Rates, Predictors ofd Labor Market Withdrawal and Hours
of Work￿The Milbank Quarterly, 85(4): 641-690.
[34] Low Pay Comission (2007) National Minumum Wage, Low Pay Commission
Uk Government.
[35] MacDonald, Martha , Shelley Phipps, and Lynn Lethbridge (2005) ￿ Tak-
ing its toll: the in￿ uence of paid and unpaid work on women￿ s wellbeing￿
Feminist Economics 11(1): 63 ￿94.
[36] Mies, M. (1986) Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale, London:
Zed Books
[37] Moriarty,J., J. Manthorpe, S.Hussein, and M. Cornes, (2008) ￿ Sta⁄ short-
ages and immigration in the social care sector￿ , Migration Advisory Com-
mittee.
[38] Seguino, S. (2007) Plus ca Change? Evidence on Glbal Trends in Gender
Norms and Stereotypes Feminist Economics 13,2:1-28.
20[39] Schober, P. (2009) The parenthood e⁄ect: what explains the increase in
gender inequality when British couples become parents? GENet conference.
University of Cambridge
[40] Taylor, M. F., Brice, J., Buck, N. & Prentice-Lane, E. (2010) British House-
hold Panel Survey User Manual Volume A: Introduction, Technical Report
and Appendices. Colchester, University of Essex.
[41] Waring, Marilyn J. (1988) Counting for nothing : what men value & what
women are worth Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, Wellington.
[42] Zellner, A. (1962). "An e¢ cient method of estimating seemingly unrelated
regression equations and tests for aggregation bias". Journal of the Amer-
ican Statistical Association 57: 348￿ 368
4.1
21